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Prediction Markets: Value Proposition
Possible value propositions 
of Prediction Markets
Information leveraged from
Probable limitations of 
existing cost methods
Technical factors rather 
than “soft” factors




updated as the program 
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under time pressure or
biased Shift of focus from estimating 




• A place where people can buy and sell 




• Iowa Electronic Markets: 2008 Presidential 
Election
– Buy and sell shares of candidate votes
– Contract pays $0.01 for each percentage 
point of Obama’s vote 
– Contract pays $1.00 if Obama wins
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2008 Democratic Nomination Race   
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Hypothesis: prediction markets are 
“efficient markets”
 Market prediction summarizes traders’ 
beliefs about what will occur in future
 Truthful revelation: biased trading gets 
counter traded (e.g., political trading markets)
 Information discovery: informed trading is 
rewarded 
 Crowds can be “wise”
 Diversity, independence, 
decentralization, aggregation
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Example: Nielsen ratings for Monday night football
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% of 115.9 million television households in the United States
The Case for Prediction Markets    
• “First order effects”: information    
aggregation for accurate prediction
– Mechanism for bringing together information    
– Incentives for searching out information
– Incentives for revealing information   
13
The Case for Prediction Markets    
• “Second order effects”: organization 
culture and communication
– Signal topics of interest
– Promote interest and engagement in topics
– “Flatten” hierarchy
– Invigorate culture 
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Questions PM’s can answer: 
practical guidelines
• “Contractible”: can write a contract about 
future events with unambiguous and 
verifiable outcomes
• Outcome categories are mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive 
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Types of Questions  
• Bad: “Sales of Xbox consoles will exceed 
expectations by the end of the year.”  
• Good: “How many Xbox consoles will be       
sold between November 1 and December 
31 2010?”, 
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Using Prediction Markets: Early 
Lessons
• Problem: “I don’t know how to run a 
prediction market; it seems hard” 
• Remedy: 
– Use Inkling software: 
www inklingmarkets com. .
– Market makers are key
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Using Prediction Markets: Early 
Lessons






– “Hard” and “Fun” questions
– Newsletters 
– Senior management involvement 
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Using Prediction Markets: Early 
Lessons
• Problem: “Insider trading”
– Some traders have/will have inside 
information
• Remedies: 
– Change questions 
– Change trading window
Restrict trading access to “insiders”–     
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Osama Bin Laden to be captured/neutralized before midnight ET on 
30 Jun 2011
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Prediction Markets: Case Study - SWCS
Design Components to consider
Stocks
Marketplace
Traders Shallow Water Combat Submersible
Implement prediction markets to surface potential 
program risks, and generate cost/schedule 
estimates as a supplement to existing estimation 
methodologies
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Prediction Markets: Benefits to SWCS
Benefit from the prediction markets event forecasts.
Increased involvement of the participants in 
anticipating events.
Identifying informal information channels in their 
organization. 





• Will SWCS be certified by August 1 2012?
First Order Questions: Program of interest
      , 
• The cost of the first unit will be $x.
Second Order Questions: Traders and the trading process
• Who has information about the program (who makes money 
in the market?)
• Where did they learn this information? 
• What is your motivation for trading? (e.g. to win/to solve the 
problem/to validate my knowledge)
Third Order Questions: Behavior outside the markets
• Did prediction market participation increase team knowledge, 
collaboration and information sharing? 
• Did it outperform a cost model in terms of agility, 
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transparency, sensitivity to events?
Prediction Market Design Principles
Sufficiently broad following
Incentives based on constant participation and ability 
to predict accurate results
Ample historical data
Mix of hard and fun questions
Anonymity of participants information  ,  
security/confidentiality
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